Do natural resources impair institutional outcomes? Existing work studies how natural resources in ‡uence the behavior of leaders in power. We study how they in ‡uence who comes to power. Our analysis focuses on oil price shocks and local democracy in Colombia, a country mired in civil con ‡ict. We …nd that when the price of oil rises internationally, legislators a¢ liated with right-wing paramilitary groups win o¢ ce more in oil-producing municipalities. These e¤ects are larger in con ‡ict-ridden locations, where armed groups are poised to intervene in local elections. Consistent with such intervention, positive price shocks also reduce electoral competition: fewer centrist candidates run for o¢ ce, and fewer centrist legislators are elected to o¢ ce. In essence, there is diminished representation at the center. Our …ndings highlight how natural resources undermine democracy by distorting elections, and suggest that con ‡ict leaves the political sector vulnerable to the resource curse.
). Alternatively, they may exacerbate redistributive demands, leading those who hold power to maintain autocracy (Boix 2003) . Given these potential consequences on the political sector, many cross-national studies have tried to assess how natural resources a¤ect democratic development. This rich literature has found mixed results 1 .
Theoretical work in this area illuminates how natural resources distort politicians' behavior once in power. But do they also distort who comes to power? And, how they come to power? 2 After all, the desire to control windfall revenues may motivate in ‡uential groups to seize power through coercive strategies. These groups may constrict electoral participation in a bid to alter election outcomes. Or, they may turn to violence in the …ght for power, skewing election outcomes toward those willing to use force.
This question holds global relevance -from Iraq to Nigeria to Burma, there is no shortage of countries with both natural resources and armed actors poised to intervene in electoral politics. We answer this question within one institutional context -Colombia -since this facilitates clean identi…cation. We harness data on local elections in nearly 1,000 municipalities over 1997-2007. We determine whether movements in the international price of oil in ‡uence election outcomes di¤erentially in more oil-dependent municipalities.
This strategy poses at least three identi…cation advantages relative to cross-national analysis. First, the price of oil is exogenous to small producers such as Colombia, but this is questionable for large producers in a global sample. Second, municipalities are more similar than countries, so there are fewer potential confounds. Third, by using standardized election outcomes, we circumvent concerns that cross-national measures such as Freedom House and Polity may not be perfectly comparable across countries.
The Colombian context o¤ers several features that make it especially well-suited to examining this topic. Its long internal con ‡ict has bred many illegal armed groups that seek to control both politics and rents from natural resources. For example, during our study period, left-wing guerrillas fought right-wing paramilitary groups. Both armed groups use politically-targeted violence, but paramilitaries also intervene directly in elections. They assassinate candidates, and help allied politicians gain o¢ ce in exchange for favorable policies (Acemoglu et al. 2013) . Recent data tracks whether legislators are a¢ liated with political parties that colluded with paramilitary groups (Fergusson et al. 2013 ).
Drawing on this data, we show that oil price shocks alter the political equilibrium. A rise in the price of oil leads to the di¤erential election of pro-paramilitary legislators in more oil-dependent areas. These e¤ects go hand-in-hand with lower competition in local elections:
positive oil price shocks widen the vote margin of winners. Also, fewer candidates run for o¢ ce, particularly from non-extreme political parties. Correspondingly, fewer centrist mayors are elected, reducing representation at the center.
We also demonstrate that violence plays a role in these distortions -which past work on the resource curse has largely ignored. First, price shocks boost aggregate municipal revenue and the presence of paramilitaries in oil areas. This is consistent with an account in which illicit groups try to control territories ‡ush with resource rents, and intervene in elections to achieve control. Second, the election e¤ects are stronger in locations with high levels of past con ‡ict, where armed groups have better infrastructure for intervening forcefully.
We cast evidence against several alternative accounts. For example, the election of proparamilitary legislators does not accompany a general shift to the right. In fact, positive oil price shocks reduce the election of center-right mayors, and exert no signi…cant impacts on the election of pro-environmental mayors. Also, there are no discernible impacts on average wages or wage inequality, which rules out economic voting.
Our analysis also examines other dimensions of the resource curse, focusing on the actions of those in power. But we do not observe signi…cant impacts of oil price shocks on general party-level incumbency 3 . We also do not …nd e¤ects on tax revenue or spending, including on public employment. This suggests a limited role of patronage networks.
Our paper complements a handful of other within-country studies of the political resource curse. Three focus on Brazil, and …nd e¤ects on outcomes such as corruption (Caselli and Michaels 2013; Brollo et al. 2013 ) and incumbency over the short run (Monteiro and Ferraz 2012) . Looking in the U.S., Goldberg et. al (2008) also suggest that resource dependence a¤ects sitting governors'vote shares. The biggest di¤erence between these papers and our paper is that we examine the role of extra-legal forces. Our …ndings highlight how natural resources can induce groups to use extreme strategies, distorting who holds power as measured by political a¢ liation 4 .
These results are in one institutional context. Do they apply more broadly? To get a preliminary sense of this, we look at cross-country data. Using x-polity scores ), we again …nd that oil price shocks exert larger e¤ects on democracy among countries that experienced more con ‡ict at the outset of the sample period. These results are of course only meant to be suggestive correlations since a full cross-country analysis would require its own attention to identi…cation and causality concerns.
Still, seeing a similar pattern internationally-of a stronger resource curse in con ‡ict areas -does support the view that Colombia is not an anomalous example.
In the remainder of the paper, we provide background on the Colombian context; lay out the mechanisms linking oil prices to elections; describe the empirical strategy and data; present the results; and conclude.
Background
In this section, we provide an overview of democracy, oil production and political con ‡ict in
Colombia.
Democracy and Local Government. Colombia has held national elections regularly since independence, except for two periods of military intervention (the last of which ended in 1958). Since 1988, the direct popular election of mayors, governors and local councils have taken place at regular pre-determined intervals of two to four years. We focus on the election of mayors and councils as these positions vary at the municipality level, and we aim to identify the impact of municipal oil dependence 5 .
Notably, mayors are not allowed to run for immediate re-election (Dávila 2009) which limits individual-level incumbency 6 . Mayors are also considered more powerful than the councils. Given their limited functions, 7 a recent debate has even emerged about abolishing these entities 8 . Council size varies by municipal population. Elections for council positions are municipality-wide, and candidates are elected through a list system.
The Oil Sector. Oil is Colombia's largest export. Over the period of our analysis, municipalities received revenue from oil production based on the following allocation process.
Foreign oil companies operating in Colombia were required to pay the government royalties amounting to 50 percent of their oil export values. An explicit revenue sharing agreement divided these royalties across the central, departmental and municipal governments 9 . The 5 Governors are department level positions, and there are 33 such departments. 6 Non-consecutive re-election is also relatively uncommon, occurring in only 5 percent of the elections events in our sample. 7 http://www.citymayors.com/mayors/colombian-mayors.html. 8 http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/MAM-1305716 9 The government places 80 percent of the oil royalties into an Oil Stabilization Fund. As codi…ed in amount given to each municipality was proportional to its production level. As of 1996, royalty revenues from oil and other natural resources, termed "regalias", have been categorized separately in the …scal accounts. 11 . The guerrillas also blow up oil pipelines, which is another way Law 141, of the remaining amount, 32 percent goes to the central government, 47.5 percent goes to the department, and 12.5 percent goes to the municipality. 10 Other revolutionary groups such as M-19 and Quintín Lame also joined during the 1980s. Most of these other groups demobilized and formed political parties in the early 1990s. For example, the M-19 movement formed the M-19 Democratic Alliance political party. 11 This form of budgetary predation became especially important after a major decentralization in 1991 transferred more …scal resources to local governments (Sanchez and Palau 2006) . As such, decentralization of …scal resources to the municipal level has been shown to increase con ‡ict (Chacón 2014).
in which resources and armed groups may be connected.
Paramilitary Intervention in Elections. When the AUC was launched, the paramilitary groups made a strategic decision to in ‡uence electoral outcomes. They formed explicit pacts with politicians to support particular candidates. For example, the Pacto de Ralito called for a "refounding of the country" and was signed by prominent paramilitary leaders and more than 50 politicians including senators, mayors and local councilors (Lopez and Sevillano 2008). The large number of links between paramilitaries and politicians were revealed by the media in the "para-politics scandal".
The evidence indicates that paramilitary organizations used many strategies to achieve their political ends 12 . They helped allied candidates by providing illegal …nancing, or by intimidating and assassinating opponents (Lopez 2010) 13 . They also bought votes, stu¤ed ballots, and used voter IDs of the deceased (Valencia 2007 
Mechanisms
There are several di¤erent pathways through which natural resources can a¤ect institutional outcomes. They may in ‡uence the process through which leaders win o¢ ce, and thus, 12 Much of this evidence comes from the con…scation of a laptop belonging to the paramilitary leader, "Jorge 40". See: http://www.semana.com/on-line/articulo/el-computador-jorge-40-puede-inicio-nuevo-proceso-8000/81379-3 13 As an example, Jorge 40's computer revealed a recording of Carlos Maria Garcia Davila, a fellow paramilitary member, coordinating with politicians on important electoral campaign in the Caribe Coast (Pedraza Saravia and Olaya 2011). determine who gains power. Alternatively, they may in ‡uence the actions of those who already hold o¢ ce. We examine each of these pathways below.
The Rise to Power
When the price of oil rises, more rents are up for grabs in oil-producing areas. In countries such as Colombia, with explicit sharing agreements, greater revenue accrues within the co¤ers of oil-rich municipalities. This boosts the value of controlling these locations, incentivizing armed groups to wrest political control. Indeed, past theoretical work shows that stealable resources promote con ‡ict owing to predation incentives (Grossman 1991; Dal Bó and Dal Bó 2011).
The bid to wrest control, in turn, motivates armed groups to intervene in elections.
Getting favored candidates into o¢ ce has clear bene…ts, since these o¢ cials are the key to accessing municipal revenue. In Colombia, mayors decide on the allocation of public contracts. They are also positioned to divert public funds toward allies.
Armed groups can accomplish their goal of manipulating elections through several strategies. First, they can …nance and support politicians from parties aligned with their political agenda or intimidate and even assassinate politicians from non-aligned parties. Targeting potential contenders will reduce the number of candidates running from other parties. This scare-o¤ e¤ect will serve to reduce the competitiveness of elections.
Second, armed groups can also manipulate the electorate. They can either intimidate voters to keep them away from the polls, or buy their votes 14 . Both the reduction in candidates and manipulation of voters will in turn, in ‡uence the political a¢ liation of elected legislators. This is the political selection e¤ect.
But, what types of candidates will get selected into o¢ ce? In our institutional context, the paramilitaries are known to operate more in oil areas and explicitly target elections.
This generates two additional implications. If electoral intervention is the work of paramil-itary groups, then positive oil price shocks should also increase o¢ cials aligned with proparamilitary parties in oil-dependent areas. There should also be a corresponding increase in the presence of paramilitary groups.
Finally, the decision to target elections may interact with the presence of armed con ‡ict.
Violent groups may already have a base of operations in locations with recurrent con ‡ict;
and, they may have more tacit knowledge of how to target opponents in these places. Both factors will lower the cost of forceful intervention in these places. Thus oil price shocks should exert larger e¤ect in locations that have previously experienced more con ‡ict.
The Actions of those in Power
Natural resources may also a¤ect institutional outcomes through the actions of those who already hold power. Under the canonical rentier mechanism, natural resources allow o¢ cials Importantly, all of these e¤ects should be strongest in municipalities that produce more oil as positive oil price increases are, by de…nition, larger in these areas.
In testing the predictions on political selection, we draw on both mayoral and local council elections. In testing competition, we focus on just mayoral elections, for which we have better measures. The margin of victory can only be de…ned for these races. Also, the interpretation of candidates running for o¢ ce is cleaner since council elections occur through a list system.
Empirical Strategy
We use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences empirical strategy to test our predictions. We assess whether changes in the international oil price exert di¤erential impacts among municipalities that produce more oil.
Our cross-sectional variation is based on the amount of oil produced in each municipality in 1993. We de…ne oil dependence as the value of oil produced in per capita terms, in 1993 15 .
During that year, 57 municipalities produced oil. The estimating equation that represents our empirical strategy is:
where y jrt are elections-related outcomes in municipality j, region r and year t; j are municipality …xed e¤ects; t are year …xed e¤ects; and X jrt are time-varying controls which always include the natural log of population. Oil jr is the oil dependence of municipality j in region r during 1993; OilPrice t is the natural log of the international price of oil in real terms in year t. captures the di¤erential e¤ect of the oil price on political outcomes in municipalities producing more oil. Note that the constituent terms do not appear in equation
(1) since municipality …xed e¤ects control for and absorb the municipal-level Oil jr variable while year e¤ects control for and absorb the annual-level OilPrice t variabler t are linear time trends in the four major geographic regions 17 . These trends account for the fact that natural resources are concentrated in particular regions which may have experienced di¤erent trends in institutional outcomes, based on varying rates of economic growth or armed group presence. For example, oil is concentrated in the Southeastern region, and guerrilla presence may have increased there in the latter part of our sample period, when the government seized control of the Demobilized Zone (DMZ), pushing the FARC eastward toward Venezuela 18 .
We estimate equation ( 
Data
We utilize data on oil production, prices and a number of elections-related outcomes. Data on mayoral and local council elections come from the Colombian national elections council, Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 19 . In our sample period, elections were held in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2007 . We follow the standard elections data and avoid using irregular elections that didn't occur on the o¢ cial election day since their timing may be endogenous.
In examining the political competition channel, we use the number of candidates running for o¢ ce in mayoral elections. We also calculate the margin of victory, de…ned as the di¤erence in vote share between the elected candidate and …rst runner-up. In addition, we 16 We examine the e¤ect of prices in levels versus growth since a growth speci…cation may lead to an excess focus on short-run e¤ects by capturing only year-to-year changes. 17 These are: Andean, Caribbean, Southeastern and Paci…c. 18 The DMZ comprises …ve municipalities in Southern Colombia that the FARC were allowed to administer over 1999-2002. 19 20 . Also, note that municipality …xed e¤ects sweep out any time-invariant e¤ect such as the general accurracy with which parties can be classi…ed in each municipality.
Our data on municipal spending and revenue, including on natural resource regalias, span 1997-2005 and come from the National Planning Department (NPD). We also use data on paramilitary and guerrilla activity, which are available over the same period. We de…ne whether paramilitaries, FARC or ELN are active in a given municipality-year based on data from the Center for Study of Economic Development (CEDE) 21 , which records whether these groups undertook activities such as arson, attacks on private property, kidnappings, blocking transport routes, injuring members of the armed forces, or carrying out political homicides.
Our con ‡ict data is from Dube and Vargas (2013) We use three measures of con ‡ict: number of paramilitary attacks, guerrilla attacks and total clashes between the armed groups and the armed groups and the state. These are used to de…ne a high con ‡ict sample, which includes municipalities in which any of these variables exceed their mean over 1988-1992.
We also use income data from household surveys called the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENH). This survey is carried out by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica (DANE), and includes data on a representative sample of 23 departments in the four regions of Colombia. The employment module gathers repeated cross-sectional data on labor market outcomes. We conduct our analysis with individuals above age 14, the o¢ cial working age in Colombia. We use data from 1998-2005, when earnings data are collected in a comparable manner 22 . We divide real monthly earnings for wage and salaried workers by monthly hours to obtain the (log) hourly wage in real terms. We trim out the top and bottom 1% outliers in this variable and also use it to generate two municipal-level variables:
the (log) ratio of wages at the 90th vs. 10th percentile of the municipal wage distribution;
and the equivalent ratio for wages at the 75th vs. 25th percentile of the distribution.
In terms of our independent variables, our measure of oil production comes from the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME) 23 . This is de…ned as the average daily production of barrels of crude oil, in hundreds of thousands of barrels, in each municipality in 1993. The international price of crude oil is obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and is measured in thousands of 2012 pesos per barrel. We also use data on coca production in 1994 from the Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes (DNE), and data on municipal population from DANE 24 . However, the table also suggests that oil locations are larger as measured by population, and di¤er on geographic dimensions such as height. Though the indicator of coca cultivation does not vary signi…cantly at conventional levels, the mean di¤erence (4%) is substantial considering the overall sample mean of 7%. These di¤erences could confound the e¤ects if electoral dynamics di¤er in the coca belt, highly populated areas, or geographic areas with oil, in a manner correlated with the price of oil. We therefore control for time-varying (log) population; as well as elevation and the 1994 coca indicator interacted with the price of oil.
These latter interactions constitute our additional controls.
Results

Oil Price Shocks and Pro-Paramilitary Legislators
We examine the e¤ect of oil price shocks on institutional outcomes by estimating equation Table 2 gauges the impact on the election of politicians from pro-paramilitary parties.
The …rst two columns look at mayoral elections, and the next two columns look at local council elections 26 .
The results show that when the price of oil rises, pro-paramilitary legislators get elected di¤erentially in more oil-dependent municipalities. The results do not change with the inclusion of our additional controls, and the e¤ects are substantial. The coe¢ cient of .081 in 25 The picture looks the same if we instead compare municipalities above and below mean oil dependence in 1993. 26 The pro-paramilitary council share variable is unavailable for 2007. Thus our analysis of council outcomes include the 1997 to 2003 elections. column (2) tells us that a 10% increase in the price boosts the likelihood of a pro-paramilitary mayor by .008 more in the average oil municipality (with oil dependence 1.01), as compared to a non-oil municipality. This represents a 5.5% increase above the pro-paramilitary mayor mean (.15). Since the price of oil rose by 130% over 1997-2007, this implies a 72% greater chance of getting at least one pro-paramilitary mayor over the four elections in our sample. This is a per-election e¤ect of 18%.
The e¤ect on the council share is also substantial, though smaller in magnitude. The coe¢ cient in column (4) suggests that a 130% price hike di¤erentially increases the share of pro-paramilitary councilors by 39% above the mean (of .11). This is a per-election e¤ect of 9.8%. The di¤erence in magnitudes may arise because mayors are more powerful than local councils. So, it would be more strategic for armed groups to target mayorships.
The Role of Con ‡ict
If the impacts on pro-paramilitary legislators re ‡ect intervention by the armed groups, these e¤ects should be stronger in locations with high levels of violence. This is where armed groups should have more experience and infrastructure for carrying out forceful interventions.
To test this, we de…ne a high con ‡ict sample where armed group attacks or clashes exceeded their average levels in the pre-sample period (1988-1992) 27 . A total of 37 percent of our municipalities fall into this group. Average oil dependence is higher here, but 19 of the 57 oil-producing municipalities are actually located in the low con ‡ict sample. Thus, there is meaningful variation in oil presence within both groups.
Columns (5)- (8) of Table 2 examine the split sample e¤ects. The results show a clear pattern. Oil price shocks exert larger and more precisely estimated e¤ects in the high con ‡ict sample, for both election outcomes. The estimate in column (8) suggests that a 130% price 27 1988 is the …rst year for which con ‡ict data is available, and 1992 is the year preceding the 1993 oil production measure. Specifying this time period enables us to capture the dramatic rise in violence in the …rst half of the 1990s. For example, average total clashes increased 3-fold from .19 to .57 between 1988 and 1992. The pattern of results also look the same if we measure con ‡ict for other time periods such as the …rst three years through 1990.
increase results in a 51% di¤erential increase in the pro-paramilitary council share variable (or 13% per-election e¤ect), in the high con ‡ict sample. In contrast, the coe¢ cient in column (7) is negative and statistically insigni…cant for the low con ‡ict sample. Overall, the results from Table 2 provide strong support for our …rst empirical prediction, that oil price shocks will induce political selection, and that the e¤ect will be larger in places that have experienced violence.
Political Competition and Representation at the Center
To explore if our main e¤ects re ‡ect armed group interference in elections, we analyze the competitiveness of local elections. We calculate the vote margin of the winner and track the number of candidates running for mayoral elections 28 . Table 3 presents these results. As shown in column (1), the oil price shock widens the margin of victory substantially. The coe¢ cient implies that a 130% oil price increase induces a di¤erential per-election e¤ect of 4.7%. We also see e¤ects on the number of candidates. On average, there are 3.9 candidates running for mayoral elections. The coe¢ cient of -.239 in column (2) tells us that a 130% oil price rise will induce a 2% per-election reduction. These two e¤ects, on the margin of victory and candidates, provide strong support for our second empirical prediction, on the competitiveness of local elections.
In the next three columns we decompose the candidate e¤ect by examining those a¢ liated with the extreme political parties as well as the non-extreme center. Columns (3) and (4) show that there are no signi…cant reductions in candidates from either pro-paramilitary parties or extreme left parties, which includes those historically associated with the guerrillas.
In contrast, column (5) shows that there were signi…cant reductions in candidates from the other political parties comprising the non-extreme center.
These e¤ects are consistent with the scare-o¤ e¤ect, in which paramilitary groups suc-cessfully drive contenders out of o¢ ce. The non-e¤ects on extreme-left candidates square with strategic incentives: areas where pro-guerrilla mayors stand a chance of winning would be extremely costly to convert into pro-paramilitary wins, so targeting the center is more strategic.
Does this scare-o¤ e¤ect translate into fewer mayorships controlled by centrist parties?
Columns (6)- (8) of Table 3 show that there are in fact, signi…cant reductions in the election of center-right and center-left mayors. In contrast, there are no impacts on extreme-left mayors 29 . Taken together, these results suggest that oil rents facilitate the rise of proparamilitary mayors, while pushing out centrist mayors. As such, they document a hollowing of the center.
Revenue and the Presence of Armed Groups
Do the e¤ects on political selection and competition re ‡ect the work of armed groups seeking control of revenue in oil-rich areas? To answer this question, Table 4 gauges whether oil price shocks in ‡uence revenue and the likelihood that paramilitary and guerrilla groups are active within oil-dependent municipalities.
Columns (1)-(2) demonstrate substantial increases in both regalias revenue and total revenue. The coe¢ cients suggest that a 130% oil price hike boosts these outcomes by 26%
and 9% more in the average oil municipality, as compared to a non-oil municipality, over the sample period. Columns (3)- (5) also show that the oil price shock di¤erentially increased the likelihood of paramilitary activity, without a¤ecting the likelihood of either FARC or ELN activity. These results support our third empirical prediction, on revenue and the activation of paramilitaries in oil areas.
Since we conceptualize revenue to be a key mechanism, an alternative approach is instrumenting revenue with the oil price interaction. We then lose the 2007 election, since we don't have revenue data for that year. Appendix Table A .2 presents these results for our 29 These results do not change if we re-classify Polo, the socialist party, as center-left vs. extreme-left. These estimates are available upon request. main outcomes (pro-paramilitary mayor, council share, margin of victory, candidates, and paramilitary activity). All of our e¤ects remain signi…cant, verifying the robustness of the results to this alternate approach.
Other Aspects of the Resource Curse
In Table 5 , we examine other dimensions of the resource curse stemming from the actions of those who hold o¢ ce. First, we look at rentier e¤ects. Columns (1)-(3) look at tax revenue, total spending and spending on personnel in municipal governments. We …nd no signi…cant e¤ects on these variables. For total spending, the coe¢ cient is positive, but statistically indistinguishable from zero. For spending on personnel, the coe¢ cient is negative, suggesting limited impacts on patronage networks. Second, we consider whether oil price shocks lead to general incumbency e¤ects in mayoral elections. But, in column (4), we …nd that there is no greater tendency to re-elect whichever party is in power 30 . For this institutional context, we …nd little evidence of our fourth and …fth empirical predictions.
Alternative Accounts
Finally, we subject our results to further robustness checks and present evidence against alternative accounts. Table A .3, we add linear trends by whether municipalities produced oil in 1993. This could be an over-control since these trends will partly control for electoral trend responses to changes in the oil price. However, we …nd that all of our main outcomes remain statistically signi…cant with the exception of the pro-paramilitary council share, for which we have a smaller sample. Even this estimate is not statistically distinguishable from the baseline speci…cation in Table 2 -column (4) at the 5% level.
If paramilitary groups were already more active in the oil region in the beginning of the period, then it could be their presence, rather than oil dependence, that drives the estimated e¤ects. To account for this confound, we measure whether any armed group (FARC, ELN or paramilitary) was active in each municipality over 1988-1992, and derive an equivalent measure for whether paramilitaries (only) were active in this pre-period. In Table A We present three pieces of evidence against this alternative mechanism. First, Table   5 examines the impact on wages and wage distribution, drawing on household-level survey data over 1998-2005. Column (5) presents an individual-level wage regression, controlling for standard demographic variables 31 . This shows that oil price shocks did not exert signi…cant e¤ects on average wages within a given municipality. This is consistent with the fact that the oil sector is not labor intensive, and therefore employs relatively few individuals within the municipal workforce. Columns (6)- (7) present results on the ratio of wages at the 90th vs. 10th percentile of the municipal wage distribution, and the 75th percentile vs. 25th
percentile of this wage distribution. These are municipal-level regressions which control for 31 These are: gender, age, age squared, whether the respondent was married and years of education.
municipal averages of the demographic variables in column (5) . These results also show there were no discernible impacts on wage dispersion. This casts doubt on the idea that our results re ‡ect changes in economic conditions that shift voters to the right.
Second, if oil price changes shifted environmental preferences, this should in ‡uence the election of legislators from the Colombian Green Party. Yet, in columns (8)- (9) of Table 5 , we
show that there were no signi…cant e¤ects on either the number of Green Party candidates or the election of Green Party mayors. Third, Table 3 -column (6) showed that oil price shocks reduced the election of mayors from center-right political parties. This directly counters the idea that voter preferences shifted to the right more generally.
Another account suggests that the oil shock may have led to the election of pro-paramilitary politicians by generating backlash against the guerrillas for their role in blowing up oil pipelines. However, Table 4 showed that oil price shocks do not signi…cantly boost guerrilla activity in the oil region. Also, we do not observe decreases in the number of extreme left candidates or mayors (in Table 3 ). Both results are inconsistent with the backlash account.
External Validity
The results above provide robust support for the idea that oil price shocks induce armed groups to intervene in local elections, distorting the democratic process, particularly in con ‡ict-ridden locations. However, these results are from one institutional context, which raises concerns regarding their external validity.
There are of course many qualitative accounts of countries where armed groups predate on natural resources and intervene in electoral politics. In Nigeria, paramilitary groups have fought over oil revenue, and intervened violently in elections to support particular candidates over the past two decades (HRW 2005b). In India, the Maoist Naxalites, who target mining areas, have used bombings to disrupt recent elections (Chawla 2015) . In Afghanistan, the Taliban continue taking cuts from mining (Vittori 2014 ) and remain resolute in curbing electoral participation.
Quantifying these patterns through a complete cross-national analysis is beyond the scope of our paper. But we present some suggestive correlations using cross-country data.
We provide more detail in the Online Appendix.
We use data on x-polity, a democracy measure developed by which purges polity of components directly related to con ‡ict. We combine this with data on oil reserves, oil prices, and civil war (from PRIO), which record whether countries experienced a con ‡ict event which resulted in at least 25 or 1000 battle-related deaths 32 . We split the sample by whether countries had any con ‡ict over the 1950s and 1960s, de…ning this as our pre-period 33 . Table A .5 shows the descriptive statistics of these variables.
We estimate a cross-country regression which closely matches our within-country speci…cation. We interact oil reserves per capita (averaged over the pre-period) with the international oil price, controlling for country and year …xed e¤ects, as well as income per-capita 34 .
The sample period covers 1970-2004. Table A.6 presents the results. As in Colombia, we again …nd that oil price shocks exert a signi…cantly larger e¤ect on democracy in the con ‡ict sample, using either the Prio 25 or Prio 1000 measure. By showing the same pattern in the international data as in the Colombia data, these estimates suggest that our …ndings are not anomalous to Colombia.
These speci…cations should be taken as exploratory since they do not solve potential endogeneity concerns, especially regarding the international price of oil. Also, much of our sample is from after 1980, when governments capture oil rents, and the oil curse tends to emerge (Andersen and Ross 2014). Consequently, our cross-national …ndings may not hold over longer time-horizons, where there is scant evidence of the resource curse (Haber and Menaldo 2011). However, the concentrated e¤ects we observe in con ‡ict locations may also help explain why the resource curse is not a ubiquitous phenomenon. This should be the 32 See Appendix for greater detail on data sources and variables. 33 PRIO data begins in the 1950s, but the …rst decade doesn't include many con ‡ict events. Extending the pre-period into the 1960s allows us to capture more con ‡ict-a¤ected locations. But we …nd the same pattern of results if we de…ne the pre-period as ending in 1965. 34 Since income is potentially endogenous to oil, we also verify that the results are not dependent on the inclusion of this control. subject of further research.
Conclusion
This paper has examined how natural resource dependence in ‡uences institutions using a within-country approach. While much of the past literature has focused on incumbent behavior, we ask whether resource reliance can in ‡uence the electoral process, and determine who comes to power.
Focusing on Colombian politics, we …nd that oil price shocks reduce electoral competition and promote the election of legislators from right-wing pro-paramilitary parties. These e¤ects are larger in con ‡ict-a¤ected locations, and correspond to the higher presence of paramilitary groups in oil-rich areas. Our results are consistent with an account in which armed groups intervene forcefully in local elections with the aim of controlling resource rich regions. Overall, they suggest that the combined e¤ect of con ‡ict and natural resources may prove particularly inimical to local democracy. Notes. Oil refers to municipalities that produced oil in 1993. Non-oil refers to municipalities that did not produce oil in 1993. *** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. (5) is an individual level wage regression and columns (6)- (7) are municipal level regressions with municipal averages of the demographic controls.
In this appendix, we present: the descriptive statistics of key variables used in our paper (Table A. . We also conduct additional robustness checks of our main …ndings, which we detail below. These include: instrumenting revenue with oil price shocks; controls for linear trends by oil producing municipalities; and controls for pre-period armed group presence. Finally, we present supplemental analysis of a cross-country analog to our within-Colombia analysis.
A.1 Instrumenting Revenue
Our paper conceptualizes revenue as a key part of the mechanism, and posits that revenue surges attract paramilitary groups which in turn in ‡uences elections. So, an alternate approach is examining how changes in revenue -instrumented by oil price shocks -a¤ects these outcomes. One drawback to this approach is that it necessarily excludes election year 2007 since we lack revenue data for that year. This is why we prefer to estimate the direct impacts of the price shocks as our primary speci…cation.
In implementing the IV approach, we treat log total revenue as the endogenous variable. We opt to instrument total revenue rather than regalias revenue since places with no natural resources receive zero regalias, leading to their exclusion from the log speci…cation. Table A .2 presents the IV speci…cation for our …ve main outcomes, estimated using 2SLS. All our results remaining signi…cant, including those related to mayoral elections, for which we now have a reduced sample. Thus our …ndings are robust to this alternate approach.
A.2 Additional Controls
As shown in Figure A. 2, the price of oil trended upward for much of our sample period. If institutional outcomes also trended upward di¤erentially in oil producing municipalities -for some reason other than the oil price increase -this could upward bias our estimates. insigni…cant at conventional levels (the p-value is .101 when other additional controls are omitted, and .163 when these other controls are included). However, even the coe¢ cient in column (7) is not statistically distinguishable at the 5% level from the baseline speci…cation in column (4) of Table 2, suggesting that the drop in signi…cance re ‡ects a power limitation.
A second potential concern stems from the fact that armed groups tend to be active in certain geographic regions. Of course, if their presence is uncorrelated with oil dependence, this cannot bias our estimates. If their pre-period presence is correlated with oil, but they do not di¤erentially alter their activities in these locations over time in a way that covaries with the oil price, this again cannot bias the estimates. However, if they increase activities in locations with pre-period presence as the price of oil changes, then this could create bias. This is particularly a concern for paramilitary groups since they have been operating in the oil region since their emergence. Our account is that paramilitary groups increase their activities in oil locations when the price of oil rises. But, if paramilitaries were already more active in oil municipalities prior to the study period, we have to discern whether oil price hikes lead them to boost activities in oil locations vs. locations where they were already present.
To distinguish the e¤ect of armed group presence from oil presence, we measure whether any armed group (FARC, ELN or paramilitary) was active in each municipality over 1988-1992. We derive an equivalent indicator for whether just the paramilitary groups were active during this preperiod. We then control for the interaction of these variables with the oil price. Table A.4 presents these results. Our results remain una¤ected by the inclusion of these controls. In fact, the magnitude of the coe¢ cients for the elections outcomes are in line with the baseline estimates in Tables 2 and   3 . The results on paramilitary activity in columns (5) and (10) help clarify that when the price of oil rises, paramilitary activity increases in the oil dependent municipalities, even after accounting for the potential correlation between oil-dependence and paramilitary presence in the pre-period.
A.3 Cross-Country Exercise
Here, we present a simple exercise to validate our …ndings from Columbia using cross-national data.
We draw on data from several sources. We measure democracy using x-polity, which was developed To facilitate the use of the x-polity measure in time-series analyses, we follow the same procedure used to transform the polity variable into polity2. We apply a "…x" that converts instances of "standardized authority codes"(i.e., -66, -77, and -88) to scores within the x-polity range, (i.e., -6 to +7). We refer to the resulting variable as x-polity2.
We use the PRIO Armed Con ‡ict Dataset, tracking civil war incidents as of 1950. There are two relevant measures. Prio 25 equals one if a country experienced a con ‡ict event that resulted in at least 25 battle-related deaths, while Prio 1000 indicates if a country experienced an event resulting in at least 1000 battle-related deaths. We de…ne our pre-period to cover the 1950s and 1960s. We then code whether countries experienced any con ‡ict event over this pre-period, for both measures.
Using this process to de…ne the con ‡ict sample helps ensure that measured con ‡ict is not a direct response to either contemporaneous oil price shocks or democracy in the country.
Data on oil reserves and population are from Haber and Menaldo (2011). We create an average oil reserves per capita over the pre-period (covering the 1950s/1960s), again to circumvent concerns that contemporaneous oil production and remaining reserves may respond to a country's regime. Finally, the international price of crude oil is obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) and is measured in dollars per barrel. Table A.5 shows descriptive statistics for these variables.
We use this data to estimate a regression that is similar to our within-country speci…cation. We interact the average reserves per capita with the log international oil price. We include country and year …xed e¤ects, and control for log income per capita. Our sample period extends from 1970-2004. We …rst show the e¤ect in the full sample and then proceed to the split sample. As with our within country speci…cation, we again …nd that the negative relationship between oil price shocks and democracy is substantially larger in the con ‡ict sample, as compared to the no-con ‡ict sample.
A-3
We interpret these e¤ects in light of di¤erent means in di¤erent groups. Consider the Prio 25 split sample results. In the sample without any con ‡ict over 1950s/60s, mean oil reserves per capita for oil producers is 6 and the mean x-polity score is 1.6. The coe¢ cient in column (2) tells us that a 130% price increase implies a 2.4% di¤erential reduction in the x-polity score of the average oil producer, as compared to a non-oil producing country in this group. In the con ‡ict sample, mean oil reserves is .329 for oil producers and mean x-polity is .49. Thus, the coe¢ cient in column (3) tells us that a 130% price increase implies a 47% di¤erential reduction in the democracy score of the average oil producer.
We …nd that the results are insensitive to a series of other changes. In de…ning the pre-period and sample period, we face a trade-o¤ -extending the pre-period allows us to capture more con ‡ict a¤ected countries, but shrinks the sample, reducing power. However, the results look similar if we perturb the dividing year to 1965 instead of 1970. The …ndings also look similar if we use the average oil reserves per capita over the entire sample instead of the pre-period sample. They also do not depend on the inclusion of per-capita income, which is a potentially endogenous control. Finally, while x-polity has the great advantage that it eliminates components that are con ‡ict-related, it also eliminates the components linked to political participation. So we also examine impacts on polity2, and …nd similar results.
1
These results are suggestive since we do not conduct a full-blown cross-country analysis. This would require its own attention to endogeneity concerns, especially on the price of oil. In addition, these e¤ects are estimated for a time period after 1970, when the oil curse tends to emerge (Andersen and Ross 2014). But of course, these patterns may not be visible over longer time horizons, as Haber and Menaldo (2011) have shown. However, we think these correlations are informative because they show a similar pattern of results in the international data as in the Colombia data. These patterns suggest that the political resource curse tends to be more severe in con ‡ict-a¤ected locations. 1 All of these estimates are available from the authors upon request.
A-4 Notes. Note that mean log population is negative since average municipal population, in millions, is a fraction. Notes. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level are shown in parentheses. Variables not shown in all specifications include municipality and year fixed effects, linear trends by region and log of population. Additional controls include the interaction of elevation and municipalities cultivating coca in 1994 with the price of oil. All specifications instrument log total revenue with an interaction of municipal oil dependence and annual log price. First stage kP F-statistic shows the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic.*** is significant at the 1% level, ** is significant at the 5% level, * is significant at the 10% level. 
